Nearly a decade after the rupture of the 2016 Brexit referendum, the political story Britain tells itself about Europe is beginning to look badly out of date. The country that was once presented as decisively Eurosceptic is, according to a growing body of polling, something quite different: a nation quietly but steadily reversing course.
The latest survey by Deltapoll for the Mirror is striking. It finds that 58 per cent of voters would now choose to rejoin the European Union in a second referendum. Separate polling by YouGov goes further still, suggesting a decisive 63–37 split in favour of rejoining. These are not marginal shifts; they represent a fundamental reconfiguration of public opinion.
Latest YouGov Brext Poll numbers
— RS Archer (@archer_rs) February 16, 2026
From all the UK population
63% – Rejoin EU
37% – Stay Out of EU
Among the 18-25 demographic
86% – Rejoin EU
14% – Stay Out of EU
From those now retired
60% – Rejoin EU
40% – Stay Out of EU
This is not simply a case of “Bregret” in the abstract. It is the product of lived experience. Since the UK formally left the EU in 2020, the promises of frictionless trade and economic liberation have collided with the realities of bureaucracy, reduced growth, and diminished international influence. Small exporters have struggled under new customs requirements, while industries from fishing to higher education have found the dividends of Brexit elusive at best.
But if economic reality has done much of the work, politics has done the rest. Ironically, some of the most strident champions of Brexit have helped to accelerate the public’s change of heart.
Take Nigel Farage and the broader orbit of Reform UK. Their continued prominence in British political discourse has not so much normalised Brexit as fossilised it, locking it into a culture war narrative that feels increasingly detached from the everyday concerns of voters. For younger Britons in particular, the rhetoric of sovereignty and border control rings hollow against the tangible losses: curtailed freedom of movement, reduced opportunities, and a sense of national diminishment.
The generational divide revealed in the polling is stark. Among 18–24-year-olds, support for rejoining the EU stands at an extraordinary 86 percent. These are citizens who, in many cases, were too young to vote in 2016 yet must live with its consequences. For them, Brexit is not a democratic triumph but an inherited constraint.
Older voters remain more sceptical, but even here the ground is shifting. While a majority of over-65s still oppose rejoining, the margins are narrowing. In some surveys, even retirees now lean towards re-entry. The once-reliable demographic backbone of Brexit is no longer as solid as it appeared.
Geographically, too, the picture is revealing. Support for rejoining spans every region of the UK, from Scotland, where it reaches 73 percent, to the Midlands and the North, where slimmer but still clear majorities now favour a return. This is not a metropolitan aberration confined to London; it is a nationwide recalibration.
The international context has also played a role. The re-emergence of figures such as Donald Trump on the global stage has served as a reminder of the political currents with which Brexit was once loosely aligned. For many British voters, the association between hardline nationalism, populist rhetoric and political instability has become less attractive over time. What once felt like a bold assertion of independence now appears, to some, as a retreat into uncertainty.
Against this backdrop, the position of the current government looks increasingly cautious. Keir Starmer has signalled a willingness to pursue closer alignment with the EU where it serves the national interest, while firmly ruling out rejoining the customs union or the single market. It is a stance designed to balance economic pragmatism with political caution, an attempt to acknowledge shifting public sentiment without reopening the wounds of the past.
Yet pressure is building. Senior figures, including David Lammy and Wes Streeting, alongside Paul Nowak of the Trades Union Congress, have all floated the idea of rejoining a customs union. The government’s decision to return to the Erasmus+ scheme is another small but symbolically significant step back towards European integration.
What is emerging is a slow, uneven process of realignment. Britain is not on the brink of rejoining the EU, and there is little immediate appetite in Westminster for another referendum. But the direction of travel is becoming harder to ignore.
Public opinion has not merely drifted; it has turned. The coalition that delivered Brexit—older voters, provincial England, and a belief in economic self-sufficiency—has weakened. In its place is a new consensus, driven by younger generations and reinforced by experience, that Britain’s future lies closer to Europe, not further from it.
In this sense, the legacy of Brexit’s most vocal advocates may prove deeply ironic. By continuing to frame politics in terms that feel increasingly anachronistic, figures associated with Brexit have helped to underline its limitations. By aligning, however loosely, with a broader populist moment now viewed with suspicion, they have made the alternative—cooperation, integration, and pragmatism—appear not only sensible but necessary.
The British public, it seems, has moved on. The question is whether its politics will follow.
